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The Changing Concept of Family and its Effect on
Louisiana Succession Law
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio*
In the 1800s, the Louisiana family was not only a social
institution, but also "the most important unit of production in the
countryside."' At that time in the United States, family and marriage
were directly related to social standing and economic status.2 Wealth
was primarily in the form of land, and there was a belief that such
wealth should stay within the bonds of blood.?
The law, as reflected in the Louisiana Digest of 1808, promoted,
what Professor Mary Ann Glendon has referred to as the "family of
the Civil Code,"4 similar to that contemplated by the Code
Napoleon.' Marriages were frequently arranged by parents of the
bride and groom based on financial considerations, rather than
romantic notions,6 and were generally considered to last until the
death of one of the parties. Although separation from bed and board
for cause was provided for in the Digest of 1808, "as it formerly
existed under the laws of the country,"7 divorce was not permitted
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1. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years in the Life of the Louisiana Civil
Code: 1870 and 1913, 53 La. L. Rev. 5, 17 (1992).
2. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 292 (1989).
3. See supra notes 1 and 2 (discussing the role of family in 1800 America).
4. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 15 (1981).
5. See id. (commenting on the concept of the "family of the
Civil Code").
6. Historian Lillian Crete explains:
For the young Creole woman, it was the pursuit of a husband, not the
pursuit of love, that became her chief preoccupation. Her goal was to
found a family of her own, and in the excitement and exhilaration of the
wedding preparations she may seldom have had time to ask herself
whether she loved the man who was about to become her husband.
Lillian Crete, Daily Life in Louisiana: 1815-1830 106 (1978).
7. La. Civ. Code arts. 1-5 (1808) provided:
Art. 1. Separation from bed and board as it formerly existed according
to the laws of the country, shall take place for the following causes.
Art. 2. The husband may claim a separation in case of adultery on the
part of his wife.
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until 1827.8 The act of marrying carried with it the obligation of
supporting and educating children born of that marriage. 9 The duty
of maintenance extended reciprocally beyond the nuclear family to all
needy ascendants and descendants.'
When a marriage ended by death of one of the spouses, the
decedent's legitimate children, usually being issue of the decedent
and the surviving spouse, inherited the property of their deceased
parent, in equal shares. " Although a widow was not an intestate heir
except in the absence of legitimate descendants, ascendants or
collaterals, 12 she was provided for by the provisions of community
Art. 3. The wife may also claim a separation in case of adultery on the
part of her husband, when he has kept his concubine in their common
dwelling.
Art. 4. The married persons that reciprocally claim a separation, on
account of excesses, cruel treatment or outrages of one of them towards
the other, if such ill treatment is of such a nature as to render their living
together insupportable.
Art. 5. Separation may also be reciprocally claimed in the following
cases, to wit:
1 stly, Of a public defamation on the part of one of the married persons
towards the other.
2dly, Of abandonment of the husband by his wife and of the wife by her
husband.
3rdly, Of an attempt of one of the married persons against the life of the
other.
8. 1827 La. Acts § 4.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 46 (1808) provided:
Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the
obligation of nourishing, maintaining and educating their children.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 48 (1808) provided:
Children are bound to maintain their father and mother and other ascendants
who are in need, and the relatives in the direct ascending line, are likewise
bound to maintain their needy descendants; this obligation being reciprocal.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 27 (1808) provided:
When a person has had several legitimate children who are living at the
time ofhis death, they all participate to his succession by equal shares, and
without distinction of sex or of primogeniture, as being in the first degree
of consanguinity, to the exclusion of all other legitimate descendants.
The same thing takes place if all those children having previously died,
have themselves left children; such grandchildren will then inherit alone
and by equal portions to the exclusion of the great grand children; and so
on for the great grand children, if there are neither children nor grand
children; the descendants of the inferior degree being always called to
inherit in defect of heirs of a superior degree.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 45 (1808) provided:
Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who
has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants, nor
ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the
exclusion only of the Territory.
In all other cases they can only bring an action against their natural
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property law' 3 and the right to claim a marital portion.' 4 When a
decedent died testate, his children were protected by a provision in
the Digest which recognized the right of his children to a forced
portion of four-fifths of the decedent's estate, as provided by Spanish
law. 5 The amount was later changed by the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825 to a graduated system, similar to French law, although not
providing as generous a forced portion as that provided for in the
Code Napoleon.1
6
This intricate, balanced system worked well in a society in which
marriages lasted a lifetime, children were an economic asset,' 7 and
the law encouraged a certain type of behavior. Christian Atias
described the civil law as resting on an unspoken balance "between
father or his heirs for alimony, the amount of which shall be fixed as is
directed in the title of father and child.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 63 (1808) provided:
Every marriage contracted within this territory, superinduces of right,
partnership or community of acquests or gains.
This community or partnership of gains takes place whether there be a
marriage contract between the parties or not, and although in case there be
one, said contract be entirely silent on this partnership or community.
14. La Civ. Code art. 55 (1808) provided:
When the wife has not brought any dowry, or when what she has
brought as a dowry is but trifling with respect to the condition of the
husband, if either the husband or wife die rich, leaving the survivor in
necessitous circumstances, the latter has a right to take out of the
succession of the deceased what is called the marital portion; that is the
fourth of said succession in full property, if there be no children, and the
same portion as a usufruct only when there are but three or a smaller
number of children; and if there be more than three children, the surviving
whether husband or wife, shall receive only a child's share in usufruct, and
he is bound to include in this portion what has been left to him as a legacy
by the husband or wife who died first.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 19 (1808) provided:
Donations either between inter vivos or mortis causa, cannot exceed the
fifth part of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his decease, one or
more legitimate children or descendants born or to be born.
16. C. Nap. art. 913 (1804) provided:
Donations, either by act inter vivos or by testament, cannot exceed one-
half of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his decease one
legitimate child; one-third, if he leaves two children; one-fourth, if he
leaves three or a greater number.
La Civ. Code art. 1480 (1825) provided:
Donations inter vivos or mortis causa cannot exceed two-thirds of the
property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, a legitimate child;
one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-thirds, if he leaves three or a
greater number.
Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever
degree they be, it being understood that they are only counted for the child
they represent.
17. See Glendon, supra note 4, at 18.
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a 'normal behavior' and an 'abnormal behavior,"' noting that "[t]he
nineteenth century legislator described the 'normal behavior' to
regulate the 'abnormal behavior."'' 8 The "normal behavior" was
encouraged and promoted; "abnormal behavior" was suppressed.
As society changed in the twentieth century, so did the concept of
family. As Louisiana became less agrarian, as the number of women
in the work force increased dramatically, 9 as divorce became not only
possible,2" but a usual occurrence, the precepts of the 'family of the
Civil Code' were viewed as less relevant. It is estimated that in the
early twentieth century, there were three divorces for every 1000
marriages.2' By 1997, 50% of all first marriages were doomed to end
in divorce.22 As the number of divorces increased, so did the number
of children living with only one parent, usually the mother.23
Additionally, most of those who divorced remarried, 24 creating step-
families with unique characteristics of their own. In the 1970s the
percentage of marriages involving previously married spouses
increased dramatically. Today, in about one-half of all marriages for
at least one of the spouses, the marriage is not a first marriage.2 In
the United States today, sixty percent of those second marriages will
end in divorce.26
This changed family is not unique to Louisiana or even to the
United States, but rather is a phenomenon shared by many Western
nations. The legal response to this different concept of family is
observable in the changes in Louisiana succession laws that were
significantly influenced by Louisiana's common law neighbors, who
18. Christian Atias, French Civil Law: Le Droit Civil 6 (Alain A. Levasseur
trans) (2002).
19. Marika Jalouaara, The Joint Effects ofMarriage Partners 'Socioeconomic
Positions on the Risk of Divorce, Demography 67, Feb. 1, 2003. In the year 2000,
both partners were employed in 53.5% of marriages. US. Divorce Statistics, at
http://www.divorcemag.com/statistics/statsUS.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
20. Divorce was permitted by 1827 La Acts § 4 and provided for in the Code
of 1870 in Article 139.
21. Jason Dor6, Marriage Should Be More Than a Ceremony, La. State Univ.
Reveille, July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23841562.
22. U.S. Census Bureau, American Families and Living Arrangements: 2000,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (last visited June
2001).
23. In 2000, there were 9.68 million female single parents, and 2.04 million
male single parents. Id.
24. United States Census Bureau, Number, Timing, andDuration ofMarriages
and Divorces: 1996, available at http://www.census.gov./prod/2002pubs/p70-
80.pdf (last visited Feb. 2002).
25. Paul R. Amato, David R. Johnson, Alan Booth, Stacy J. Rogers, Continuity
and Change in Marital Quality Between 1980 and 2000, 65 Journal of Marriage
and Family Law 1 (2003).
26. Id.
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emphasized personal autonomy in dealing with one's estate. Two
particular concepts, that of the usufruct of the surviving spouse and
that of forced heirship, are illustrative of the distinctive approach
taken in Louisiana, as compared to its ancestral counterpart, France.
In 1844, the concept of the usufruct of the surviving spouse was
introduced in Louisiana." It was later incorporated into the Civil
Code of 1870 as Article 916 and provided for a usufruct to the
surviving spouse in community over community property inherited by
issue of the marriage with the decedent, where the decedent had not
disposed by will of his share in the community property. The
usufruct was to end on the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
2 8
The usufruct is an illustration of the balance the redactors were
trying to achieve. By limiting the spousal usufruct to community
property, the system did not affect the rights of the children to
unfettered use and disposal of their deceased parent's separate
patrimony. Also, by having the usufruct apply only to property
inherited by issue of the marriage of the decedent and the surviving
spouse, the possibility of a stepparent exercising rights over property
inherited by the decedent's children was avoided. By terminating the
usufruct on remarriage, the article recognized that the surviving
spouse would probably not need the protection of the usufruct if she
were to enter into a remarriage, and it also protected the children from
the influence of their surviving parent's new spouse. Thus, this 1844
addition to the laws of Louisiana was consistent with the balance of
interests between the decedent's surviving spouse and his children.
Although not formally amended until 1975, the usufruct article
was the subject of much litigation, resulting in "judicial amendment"
many times before the legislature took action. One of the first
questions to be raised was the application of the usufruct when the
decedent by will attempted to dispose of his community property in
favor of his widow. In 1876, in the case of Forstall v. Forstall,3° the
decedent had written a will leaving all of his share of the community
property to his widow, without providing for his three children who
27. 1844 La. Acts No. 152, § 2.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 916 (1870) provided:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left issue of
the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by last will and
testament, of his or her share in the community property, the survivor shall
hold a [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life, so much of the share of
the deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such
issue. This usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the survivor shall
enter into a second marriage.
29. For a more thorough description of the changes prior to 1989, see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Of Legal Usufruct, the Surviving Spouse, and Article 890 of the
Louisiana Civil Code: Heyday for Estate Planning, 49 La. L. Rev. 803 (1989).
30. 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876).
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were forced heirs. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that since the
deceased, by writing a will, had disposed of his community property,
Article 916 dealing with the spousal usufruct was not applicable.
Rather, the court gave the widow the option of keeping her legacy of
the disposable portion or renouncing the legacy and taking only the
usufruct "by law" over the decedent's share of the community
property inherited by the issue of the marriage. It was a question of
either taking by intestacy or taking by will, but not a combination of
the two.
Withdrawing from the rationale in Forstall, the 1888 case of
Succession of Moore,3' allowed a widow to keep both the disposable
portion in full ownership granted to her by the will of her deceased
spouse, and the usufruct over the forced portion inherited by children
of the marriage. In Moore, the decedent, who died possessed of only
community property, had bequeathed the usufruct of all his property
to his wife and also left a codicil giving her the disposable portion in
full ownership. Introducing an "adversity test" for evaluation of the
application of the usufruct, the court held that since the testator had
not done anything adverse to granting the legal usufruct of Article
916, he had in effect confirmed it. Similarly, in the later case of
Winsberg v. Winsberg,32 decided in 1957, the decedent died possessed
only of community property, which he left entirely to his wife to the
exclusion of his four children, as Mr. Forstall had done before him.
That court also allowed the wife to keep both the disposal portion and
the usufruct over the forced portion inherited by the four children.
Gradually, this line of reasoning came to recognize two types of
usufruct - a "legal" usufruct, being one that resulted from intestacy or
confirmation by testament of the Article 916 usufruct, and a
"testamentary" usufruct, being one created by testament in such a
manner that it deviated from the Article 916 mold and, thus, was not
permitted to impinge on the forced portion inherited by the decedent's
issue. If the usufruct were deemed to be a "legal" usufruct, the
usufructuary was exempt from providing security3 and from paying
Louisiana inheritance tax." Additionally, such a "legal" usufruct was
sanctioned by law over the forced portion inherited by the children of
the decedent, thus not considered an impingement on the legitime of
each forced heir. However, along with the advantages of such a
"legal" usufruct for the surviving spouse came the balancing
disadvantages necessary to protect the interests of the children. One
of those limitations was that the original 916 usufruct was to
31. 4 So. 460 (1888).
32. 96 So. 2d 44 (1957).
33. Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Liuzza, 143 So. 2 (1932); Succession of
Dielnann, 43 So. 972 (1907); Succession of Glancey, 38 So. 826 (1905).
34. Succession of Marsal, 42 So. 778 (1907).
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terminate upon the remarriage of the spouse, thus preventing a
surviving parent's new spouse from enjoying any benefit of the
usufruct over property owned by the children of the decedent. Where
a decedent was found to have confirmed the 916 usufruct by will to
his wife, the court in the Succession of Chauvin, 5 in 1972, made it
clear that a legal usufruct confirmed by testament would end on
remarriage over all the property inherited by the children of the
decedent, just as would occur if the decedent had died intestate. A
question later arose as to whether any deviation in a testator's will
from the prerequisites provided in Article 916 would render the
usufruct "testamentary" rather than "legal" and thus not allow the
usufruct to extend over the forced portion inherited by the decedent's
children. In the Succession of Waldron,36 decided in 1975, the
decedent who was possessed of only community property left a will
bequeathing to his daughter her forced portion, subject to the usufruct
of his wife for life. Clearly deviating from the 916 usufruct that
terminated on remarriage, the usufruct was challenged as being
"testamentary" rather than "legal" and, thus, an impingement of her
legitime. The court allowed the usufruct to stand as a "legal"
usufruct, but reasoned that, should the spouse remarry, the usufruct
would be converted into a "testamentary" usufruct and would cease
as to the daughter's forced portion.
It was beginning to become clear that testators were attempting to
grant their surviving spouses usufructs with all the advantages of the
916 usufruct, and then some. As life expectancy of spouses increased
over the years, testators wished to provide their surviving spouses the
security and protection of an income and home for a lifetime. The
first legislative recognition of this came in 1975 with the sanctioning
of the confirmation of the legal usufruct beyond the remarriage of the
surviving spouse.3' That same year, the legislature enacted a
provision allowing a testator to grant a "legal" usufruct over the
family home, which was defined as "community property last
occupied by the deceased and the surviving spouse as a home."38
35. 257 So. 2d 422 (La. 1972).
36. 323 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975).
37. 1975 La. Acts No. 680.
38. 1976 La. Acts No. 227, §1 added a new Article 916.1 which provided:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall not have
disposed by last will and testament of his or her share in the family home,
the survivor shall hold in usufruct, during his or her natural life, the
deceased's share of the family home, in addition to any other benefit
conferred by Article 916 and notwithstanding any other provisions to the
contrary. This usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the survivor shall
enter into a subsequent marriage unless the usufruct has been confirmed
for life or any other designated period to the survivor by the last will and
testament of the predeceased husband or wife, and the rights of forced
2003] 1167
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Since the surviving spouse, who was granted this expanded "legal"
usufruct, was also the parent of the decedent's children, the risk of
depriving the children of their inheritance was minimal, and the balance
between spouse and children was left relatively in tact. However, by
allowing the surviving spouse to remarTy and hold the usufruct, these
changes did allow for the possibility that the spouse's new partner might
benefit, perhaps at the expense of the decedent's own children.
Despite the judicial expansion of the usufruct and the radical
changes in family structure, the state reaffirmed its commitment to the
system of forced heirship by repeating in the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution the protection against abolition of forced heirship that had
been in the Constitution of 1921.39 The new provision, however, was
altered to authorize the legislature to determine who were forced heirs
the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison. 4
Yet, despite this apparent reaffirmation, this also was the time when
many questioned the wisdom of the concept of forced heirship. In 1976,
a debate was held at Louisiana State University in which the proponents
praised the utility of the institution,4' the opponents rejected it as
"unsound in theory and... unsound in practice," '42 and others proposed
alternatives such as a family maintenance system to replace the system.43
heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which usufruct
shall not be an impingement upon the legitime.
Family home, for the purposes of this Article, shall be limited to
community property last occupied by the deceased and the surviving
spouse as a home, and in the case of city, town, or village property, shall
include not more than one lot or lots of ground on which the family
residence is actually situated, and in the case of rural property, shall
include not more than 20 acres of land on which the family residence is
situated.
39. La. Const. art. 4, § 16 (1921) provided:
No law shall be passed abolishing forced heirship or authorizing the
creation of substitutions, fidei commissa or trust estates; except that the
Legislature may authorize the creation of trust estates for a period not
exceeding 10 years after the death of the donor; provided, that where a
natural person is the direct beneficiary said period may be made to extend
until 10 years after his majority; and provided further, that this prohibition
as to trust estates or fidei commissa shall not apply to donations strictly for
educational, charitable or religious purposes.
40. La. Const. art. 12, § 5 (1974) provided:
No law shall abolish forced heirship. The determination of forced heirs,
the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison shall be
provided by law. Trusts may be authorized by law, and a forced portion
may be placed in trust.
41. Thomas B. Lemann, In Defense of Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 20
(1977).
42. Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced
Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1977).
43. Gerald LeVan, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29 (1977).
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Another problem with Louisiana's succession law, which became
apparent at the time of these intense debates regarding forced heirship
and its structure, was that illegitimate children were denied equal
protection as to the inheritance of their parents.' Because the issue
of rights for illegitimate children and the question of forced heirship
were related, a Joint Legislative Subcommittee on Forced Heirship
and Rights of Illegitimate Children undertook a study of these issues,
while the Louisiana State Law Institute Successions Committee was
engaged in a similar activity.
The 1981 legislative package included proposals from both
groups and culminated in significant changes in Louisiana succession
law. The changes of 1981 granted illegitimate children equal
standing with legitimate children if the illegitimate children were
acknowledged by the decedent or could prove filiation in a timely
manner.
45
Pursuant to what some viewed as an invitation by the 1974
Constitution in its authorization of the legislature to determine who
were forced heirs, the legislature eliminated parents as forced heirs to
the community property of a decedent in 1979.46 In the 1981
legislation, the legislature went even further, and parents were also
eliminated as forced heirs as to the separate property of the
44. For example, La. Civ. Code art. 919 (1870) provided:
Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who
has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor
ascendants, nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the
exclusion only of the State.
For a full discussion of the rights of illegitimates at this time, see Katherine V.
Lorio, Succession Rights of Illegitimates in Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
45. 1981 La. Acts No. 720, § 1 amended and reenacted Article 209 and
provided:
A. A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative
of the parent by legitimation as by acknowledgment under Article 203
must prove filiation by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil
proceeding instituted by the child or an his behalf within the time limit
provided in this Article.
B. The proceeding required by this Article must be brought within one
year of the death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the
child's birth, whichever first occurs. This time limitation shall run against
all persons, including minors and interdicts. If the proceeding is not
timely instituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation.
C. The right to bring this proceeding is heritable.
By 1982 La. Acts No. 527, § 1, this article was amended to provide that if the
alleged parent was deceased, filiation would have to be provided by clear and
convincing evidence.
Another amendment by 1984 La. Acts No. 810 included an exception to the
prescription, allowing the action for filiation to be brought within one year of death
of the alleged parent for purposes of recovering damages in tort.
46. 1979 La. Acts No. 778, § 1.
2003] 1169
L 0 UISIANA LA W RE VIE W
decedent.47 In addition, the amount of the forced portion was
decreased for descendants from one-third to one-fourth if one child
survived the decedent, remained at one-half for two children, but
decreased from two-thirds to one-half for three or more children.48 In
addition the law also was amended to result in an expansion of the
disposable portion in cases of disinherison or unworthiness of heirs.49
The manner of calculating the forced portion was also altered
significantly. Excluded from inclusion in the mass estate were
donations inter vivos, made within three years of the donor's death,
to charitable, educational, or religious organizations, ° donations to
a spouse of a previous marriage made during that marriage,51 and
donations inter vivos by a donor to his descendants if each forced heir
and the root represented by that forced heir received the same value
of property by donation inter vivos in the same calendar year.52
Although life insurance proceeds to a named beneficiary were long
regarded as sui generis and not includable in the mass estate, 53 the
1981 legislation provided that when such proceeds were paid to a
forced heir, that amount should be credited in satisfaction of the
heir's legitime. 54  The same treatment was afforded for pension
benefits. Also, the concept of revendication allowing a forced heir
to follow immovable property, which had been donated by the
decedent and subsequently sold to a third person was eliminated as a
form of relief for the forced heir.
56
The 1981 legislation also included a pivotal change in the spousal
usufruct, affecting the precarious balance between the spouse and the
descendants. Although the ability to grant a legal usufruct by
testament over separate property was permitted in 1979,17 such a
spousal usufruct would only extend to property inherited by children
of the decedent and his surviving spouse. Yet, even that liberal
47. 1981 La. Acts No. 442.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1493, amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 884, § 1.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 1498, amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 645, § 10.
50. 1981 La. Acts No. 740, § 1.
51. 1981 La. Acts No. 881, § 1.
52. 1981 La. Acts No. 765, § 1.
53. La. R.S. § 22:647(A)(1) provides:
The lawful beneficiary, assignee, or payee, including the insured's
estate, of a life insurance policy or endowment policy, heretofore or
hereafter effected shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of the policy
against the creditors and representatives of the insured and of the person
effecting the policy or the estate of either, and against the heirs and
legatees of either such person ....
54. 1981 La. Acts No. 765, § 1.
55. 1981 La. Acts No. 909, § 1.
56. 1981 La. Acts No. 739, § 1.
57. 1979 La. Acts No. 678, § 1.
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extension of the usufruct was deemed insufficient as the populace
married, remarried, and remarried again. Deviating more from the
balancing act of the original article, Article 916 was altered again by
the 1981 legislation. Not only did Article 916 get renumbered and
become Article 890, but it provided that even in an intestate
succession, the spousal usufruct would extend over property inherited
by all the decedent's children, issue or non-issue of his marriage to
his surviving spouse,5" thus allowing a stepparent to enjoy a usufruct
over property inherited by the decedent's children.
Despite all these changes, as well as amendments making it easier
to disinherit descendants," the movement to eliminate forced heirship
in Louisiana escalated. With a constitutional amendment protecting
it from abolition, forced heirship could still only be eliminated by
getting a two-thirds vote of the legislature followed by a statewide
popular vote approving the abolition. Several attempts to get
legislative support for that effort failed? °
The chief proponent of changes to Louisiana's forced heirship law
was a conscientious senator from the northern part of Louisiana who
was prompted by some of his constituents to work toward the
adoption of a system of "free testation," which would allow a testator
to leave nothing to his children if he so desired. Many of these
constituents were military personnel from common law states who
were serving at the time at Barksdale Airforce Base in Bossier,
Louisiana, close to Shreveport.6 Since the constitutional amendment
route appeared closed at the time, the idea of a "redefinition" of
forced heirship was born. The theory was that the Constitution of
1974, by authorizing the legislature to determine who were forced
heirs, allowed the legislature to "redefine" forced heirs as only those
children of the decedent who were under the age of twenty-three at
the time of the decedent's death. As this was argued to be a mere
"redefinition"within the allowable parameters of the Constitution, the
advocates of this approach contended that no amendment to the
Constitution would be necessary. All that would be required was the
passage of a bill by the legislature by majority vote. Such a bill,
"redefining" forced heirship to include children under the age of
58. 1981 La. Acts No. 911, § 1, amended by 1982 La. Acts 445, § 1.
59. See 1984 La. Acts No. 445, § 1 (permitting ascendants to disinherit
descendants when the cause related to acts committed against the grandparent or the
parent); 1985 La. Acts No. 456, § 1 (adding a cause for failure of a major child to
communicate with a parent without just cause for a period of two years and shifting
the burden for proving reconciliation or that the cause did not exist to the forced
heir).
60. S.B. No. 100, 1980 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1980); S.B. No. 45, 1984 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 1984); H.B. No. 115, 1985 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1985).
61. Senator Sydney Nelson represented the Bossier-Shreveport area of
Louisiana which is the site of the Barksdale Airforce Base.
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twenty-three and later amended to also include disabled children of
any age, was introduced in 1989.
Joining in the alliance to "redefine" forced heirs to exclude
children over the age of twenty-three were an influential former
council President from Plaquemine Parish' and his second wife who
hired the former speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives'
as a lobbyist to support the cause of "free testation." Supporters of the
movement included other second and subsequent spouses who
donned large "free testation" buttons as they testified in favor of the
bill and unhappy parents who wished to disinherit children for causes
not enumerated in the Civil Code.65 Opponents included some older
62. 1989 La. Acts No. 788 amended and reenacted Articles 1493, 1495, and
1496 to provide:
Art. 1493. Disposable portion
Donations inter vivos and mortis causa can not exceed three-fourths of
the property of the disposer, if her leaves, at this decease, one child under
the age of twenty-three or one child who had been interdicted or who is
subject to being interdicted because of mental incapacity of physical
infirmity; and one-half; if he leaves two or more children under the age of
twenty-three or two or more children who have been interdicted or who
are subject to being interdicted because of mental incapacity or physical
infirmity.
Under the name of children are included descendants of the first degree
who are under the age of twenty-three, or who have been interdicted or
who are subject to being interdicted because of mental incapacity or
physical infirmity. Representation by descendants shall be permitted
provided the child they represent would not have been twenty-three years
of age on the date the donor's death.
Art. 1495. Forced heirs
In the case prescribed by the preceding article, the child or children
under the age of twenty-three or the child or children who have been
interdicted or who are subject to being interdicted because of mental
incapacity or physical infirmity are called forced heirs, because the donor
can not deprive them of the portion of his estate reserved for them by law,
which portion shall be called the legitime, except in the cases where he has
just cause to disinherit them.
Art. 1496. Disposable portion in absence of forced heirs
Where there are no forced heirs, donations inter vivos or mortis causa
may be made to the whole amount of the property of the disposer, saving
the reservation made hereafter.
63. See Interview by Anne Ritchie with Iris Kelso, Interview #2 (pp. 42-
74),Washington Press Club Foundation, New Orleans, La. (Feb. 17, 1991),
available at npc.press.org/wpforall/Kelso2.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
64. E.L. "Bubba Henry" was hired to lobby for support of the changes. See
Cynthia Samuel, Let's Rescue Forced Heirship, B.R. Advocate, Nov. 26, 1989, at
llB.
65. The causes for parents to disinherit children were listed in La. Civ. Code
art. 1621 (1870), amended by 1983 La. Acts No. 566, § I and 1985 La. Acts 456,
§ 1 and included:
1. If the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent, or if he or she
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children who were the products of first marriages and a small group of
law professors who referred to the entire movement as "regrettable."
The legislature passed the act "redefining" forced heirs, but
deferred its effectiveness, pending work by the Louisiana Law Institute
to integrate this "redefinition" into existing law.67 A new act, with
essentially the same "redefinition" of forced heirs was passed in 199068
despite warnings from apprehensive scholars as to its dubious
constitutionality. 69 Eventually, a case challenging the "redefinition"
found its way to the Louisiana Supreme Court. In the Succession of
Lauga7 decided on September 10, 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared the entire act "redefining" forced heriship unconstitutional, as
it in essence abolished the concept of forced heirship as contemplated
by the Constitution, by depriving children of equal shares of a forced
portion in a decedent's estate.7'
Thus, after the Lauga decision, all children remained forced heirs,
regardless of age or disability. A change of that status would require
has actually struck the parent; but a mere threat is not sufficient.
2. If the child has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruelty, of a crime or
grievous injury.
3. If the child has attempted to take the life of either parent.
4. If the child has accused a parent of any capital crime, except, however,
that of high treason.
5. If the child has refused sustenance to a parent, having means to afford
it.
6. If the child has neglected to take care of a parent become insane.
7. If the child refused to ransom them, when detained in captivity.
8. If the child used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from
making a will.
9. If the child has refused to become security for the parent, having the
means, in order to take him out of prison.
10. If the son or daughter, being a minor, marries without the consent of
his or her parents.
11. If the child has been convicted of a felony for which the law provides
that the punishment could be life imprisonment or death.
12. If the child has known how to contact the parent, but has failed
without just cause to communicate with the parent for a period of two
years after attaining the age of majority, except when the child is on active
duty in any of the military forces of the United States.
66. See Katherine Spaht, Kathryn Lorio, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia Samuel and
Frederick Swaim, The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable
"Revolution," 50 La. L. Rev. 409 (1990).
67. Since the original 1989 La. Acts No. 788 was not the product of the
Louisiana Law Institute, nor had the Institute ever positively voted to abolish or
redefine forced heirship, the role of the Institute was confined to one of
"correlating" the new act with existing codal articles and revised statutes.
68. 1990 La. Acts No. 147.
69. See Spaht, Lorio, Picou, Samuel, and Swaim, supra note 66, at 409.
70. 624 So. 2d l156(La. 1993).
71. Id. at 1169-70.
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a constitutional amendment. In the summer of 1995, those favoring
abolition of forced heirship were successful in obtaining just such an
amendment. By two-thirds vote of the Louisiana legislature, an act
was passed resulting in placing a constitutional amendment on the
state ballot the following October, which, in essence declared forced
heirs to be children under the age of twenty-four or those mentally or
physically incapable of taking care of their person or estate.72
Included was an "implementation" act contemplated to go into effect
in case the constitutional amendment were to pass.73
The latter was subsequently replaced with another act which was
much more extensive in its breadth,74 and purported to revise, amend,
and re-enact the entire chapter of the Civil Code dealing with the
disposable portion and its reduction. 7' The new act defined forced
heirs as "descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death
of the decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or
descendants of the first degree of any age who, because of mental
incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the
death of the decedent."76 Grandchildren may also be forced heirs by
representation in two instances: 1) when a descendant of the first
degree predeceases the decedent and the "descendant of the first
degree would have been twenty-three years of age or younger at the
time of the decedent's death' 7 and 2) when a descendant of the first
degree predeceases the decedent, "if the child of the descendant of the
first degree, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is
permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or
72. The proposition to amend Article XII, §5 of the Louisiana Constitution
passed on October 21, 1995, provided:
To abolish forced heirship, except to require forced heirship for children
twenty-three years or younger and to authorize the legislature to classify
as forced heirs children of any age who are incapable of taking care of
their person or estate due to mental incapacity or physical infirmnity.
73. 1995 La. Acts No. 1180.
74. 1996 La. Acts No. 77.
75. Book III, Title II, Chapter 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 was
revised, amended and re-enacted by 1996 La. Act No. 77, § 1 (1996 Ist
Extraordinary Session), effective June 18, 1996. For a more thorough explanation
of the changes, see generally, Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Forced Heirship: The
Citadel Has Fallen - Or Has It?, 44 La. Bar Journal 16 (1996); Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: the Regrettable "Revolution "Completed, 57 La.
L. Rev. 55 (1996); Kerry J. Miller, The New Forced Heirship Law, Its
Implementing Legislation, and Major Substantive Policy Changes of the Louisiana
State Law Institute's Proposed Comprehensive Revision of the Successions and
Donations Laws, 71 Tul L. Rev. 223 (1996).
76. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(A), amended by La Acts 1996, 1st Extraordinary
Session No. 77, § 1.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B).
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administering his or her estate at the time of the decedent's death,
regardless of the age of the descendant of the first degree at the time
of the decedent's death."78
The 1996 Code revision also made some changes to the law
regarding the spousal usufruct. Prior to the revision, all the
accumulated changes to the spousal usufruct were incorporated into
the one same intestate article.79 The revised articles trifurcated the
provisions keeping the intestate provision in the intestate portion of
the Code,8d and created two articles, which were placed in the testate
chapter of the Code,8' one to deal with the usufruct created by
testament, 2 and another dealing with the forced heir's right to request
security when a usufruct affected the legitime and either the forced
heir was not a child of the surviving spouse or the spouse's usufruct
78. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(C).
79. La. Civ. Code art. 890 (1982) provided:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, and shall not have
disposed by testament of his share in the community property, the
surviving spouse shall have a legal usufruct over so much of that share as
may be inherited by the descendants. This usufruct terminates when the
surviving spouse contracts another marriage, unless confirmed by
testament for life or for a shorter period.
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter
period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his separate property.
A usufruct authorized by this article is to be treated as a legal usufruct
and is not an impingement upon legitime.
If the usufruct authorized by this article affects the rights of heirs other
than children of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving
spouse or affects separate property, security may be requested by the
naked owner.
80. La. Civ. Code art. 890 provides:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, the surviving spouse
shall have a usufruct over the decedent's share of the community property
to the extent that the decedent has not disposed of it by testament. This
usufruct terminates when the surviving spouse dies or remarries,
whichever occurs first.
81. Both La. Civ. Code arts. 1499 and 1514 were placed in Chapter 3, The
Disposable Portion and its Reduction in Case of Excess, of Title I, Book III.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 provides:
The decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over all or
part of his property, including the forced portion, and may grant the
usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumables as provided in the
law of usufruct. The usufruct shall be for life unless expressly designated
for a shorter period.
A usufruct over the legitime in favor of the surviving spouse is a
permissible burden that does not impinge upon the legitime, whether it
affects community property or separate property, whether it is for life or
a shorter period, whether or not the forced heir is a descendant of the
surviving spouse, and whether or not the usufructuary has the power to
dispose of nonconsurnables.
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affected separate property.8 3 The testate provision permits the testator
to grant the surviving spouse a usufruct over both separate and
community property, including the forced portion,8' and the
complementary security article allows non-issue of the marriage
between the decedent and the surviving spouse to request security
when the surviving spouse's usufruct affects a forced heir's legitime
and allows all forced heirs to request security over their legitimes
when separate property is affected. 5
Although Article 890, the intestate article, no longer speaks of
security, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3154.1,
recognizing the right of non-issue of the marriage between the
decedent and the surviving spouse to request security over community
or separate property inherited by such non-issue was retained, with no
limitation as to its application only to the legitime.86 Thus, arguably,
unless the legislature provides otherwise, non-issue of the marriage
may still request security over their entire inheritance if it is subject
to the intestate 890 spousal usufruct. This would include non-issue
who are not forced heirs, as well as forced heirs, without limitation
only to their respective legitimes s7
83. La. Civ. Code art. 1514 provides:
A forced heir may request security when a usufruct in favor of a
surviving spouse affects his legitime and he is not a child of the surviving
spouse. A forced heir may also request security to the extent that a
surviving spouse's usufruct over the legitime affects separate property.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 1499, supra note 82.
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1514, supra note 83.
86. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3154.1 provides:
If the former community or separate property of a decedent is burdened
with a usufruct in favor of his surviving spouse, successors to that
property, other than children of the decedent's marriage with the survivor,
may request security in accordance with the preceding article [Article
3154 deals with the right of forced heirs and a surviving spouse in
community to compel an executor to furnish security] in an amount
determined by the court as adequate to protect the petitioner's interest.
87. House Bill number 724, proposed to the Louisiana legislature on
recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, to amend Civil Code Article
573 and to repeal Code of Civil Procedure Article 3154. 1, limiting the request for
security by descendants to the extent their respective legitimes were affected, was
not adopted. H.B. 724, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003). See J. Randall Trahan,
Cynthia A. Samuel, and Katherine S. Spaht, Minority Report (departing from the
recommendation of the Council at the Law Institute as to one paragraph of the
proposed amendment to Civil Code Article 573, supporting the unanimous position
of the Property Committee of the Law Institute), H.B. 724 (La. 2003) (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 2003). The report notes that when Article 573, which exempts
legal usufructuaries from giving security, was revised in 1976 by La. Act 103, the
spousal usufruct of Article 916 only applied to issue of marriage of the decedent
and the surviving spouse. It posits that "[f]or a proper interpretation and
application, Civil Code Article 573 must be read together with Civil Code Article
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Civil Code Article 1499, the testamentary usufruct article, also
allows the testator to grant the usufructuary the power to dispose of
nonconsumables subject to the usufruct. Additionally, so as to ensure
the opportunity of taking full advantage of the tax benefit afforded by
the marital deduction,' the article states that the usufruct granted
pursuant to this article "shall be for life unless expressly designated
for a shorter period. 8
9
Obviously, the changes in Louisiana succession law were
influenced by the changes in the society it serves. One of those
changes was the weakening of familial ties beyond the nuclear family
of father, mother, and children,9" and another was the rise of
dependence on the government for obligations previously undertaken
by the family. Supported by the argument that Social Security
benefits would be available for aging parents,9' the Louisiana
legislature eliminated parents as forced heirs as to community
property in 197992 and as to separate property in 1981.9 Yet, at the
same time that life expectancy increased, the desire to provide for
one's surviving spouse also seemed to increase. The response was to
increase the disposable portion available to the surviving spouse, and
to expand the usufruct of that spouse for a lifetime over property
inherited by descendants of the decedent.
As the form of wealth changed from being predominantly in the
form of land to including more movable property and from inherited
familial wealth to earned compensation, often in the form of work-
related benefits such as insurance and pensions,94 the value of such
movable work-related benefits increased. For some decedents, their
largest assets ARE their pension plans. Thus, when the legislature
exempted this major asset from inclusion in the active mass, making
it available to be freely given to the surviving spouse, a major blow
was rendered to forced heirs. As marriages ceased to last a lifetime
and serial polygamy became commonplace,95 facilitated by easier
1514 which requires security when the usufruct of the surviving spouse attaches to
separate property or to community property inherited by descendants other than
issues of the marriage." Id. at Appendix A (Yiannopoulos proposed text for report).
88. I.R.C. § 2056 (2002) allows for the usufruct to qualify for the marital tax
deduction if it is granted for life.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 1499.
90. Glendon, supra note 2, at 238.
91. See Gerald Le Van, Alternatives to Forced Heirship, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 29,
46 (1977).
92. 1979 La. Acts No. 778, § 1.
93. 1981 La. Acts No. 42.
94. See Glendon, supra note 4, at 170-76.
95. See Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st
Century?, 50 Amn. J. Comp. L. 101, 103 (2002) in which the authors observe,
"[W]ithout calling it by name, modem divorce law and practice have resulted in a
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divorce laws, the surviving spouse was often not the parent of the
decedent's children. At the same time the favoring of the surviving
spouse at the expense of the decedent's children, fueled by federal tax
provisions encouraging the decedent to bequeath as much as possible
to the surviving spouse in order to take advantage of the unlimited
marital deduction, continued. 96
The law in Louisiana seemed to become, not necessarily what was
best for society as a whole, but what was desired by each individual
testator. The choices reflecting those desires changed as the
institution of marriage itself changed. As marriages became more
based on "emotional," rather than "economic" considerations, 97 the
bonding between spouses became simultaneously "close" and
"intense" while it lasted.9" It is not surprising that spouses, while
happily married and with a tax structure encouraging it as well,
expressed a desire to leave their entire estates to their surviving
spouses, even when children also survived the decedent.99 When the
children were issue of the decedent and the surviving spouse, that
arrangement was often wise in that it protected the spouse, and since
the spouse would presumably also have an interest in the well-being
of her own children, the children of the decedent would ultimately be
cared for at the time of death of the second spouse. It is the other
aspect of this "new" marriage that creates more difficulty. For,
although spouses tend to be close while the marriage last, marriages
are much more "fragile" and "unstable" and often of limited
duration.' ° The interests of the children become much more
precarious when the surviving spouse is a step-parent of the children
of the decedent, a not uncommon phenomenon in our society of
"serial polygamy.''. The preference of most spouses as to
"appropriate distribution of the estate between spouse and children [in
such cases] becomes uncertain."' 1 2 In fact, in analyzing the results of
a survey conducted in 1978, it was concluded that most intestate
decedents actually preferred a split distribution where the second or
subsequent spouse would receive about 60 to 70% of the decedent's
estate with the rest shared equally by the decedent's children and that
sort of legitimization of polygamy by way of legalizing multiple, successive
marriages or relationships of persons who have continuing legal, financial and
social ties to prior partners and children."
96. I.R.C. § 2056 (2002).
97. See Glendon, supra note 4, at 29.
98. See Glendon, supra note 4, at 28.
99. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution
at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 An. B. Res. J.
319, 359.
100. Glendon, supra note 4, at 28.
101. See Krause & Meyer, supra note 95.
102. See Fellows, supra note 99, at 364.
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such an arrangement would actually "best accommodate societal
needs."' 3 Such an estate plan could easily have been fashioned in
Louisiana prior to the radical changes in forced heirship. If the
spouses shared a community of acquets and gains, the surviving
spouse could receive her half of the community and could also
receive one-half of the decedent's portion by will, effectively leaving
the spouse with 75% of the community property. Yet, despite that
possibility, some testators wished to leave the surviving spouse even
more. Hence, the law was changed, limiting forced heirs to children
in need of maintenance and increasing the powers of a surviving
spouse usufructuary, even over the now-limited forced portion. The
preference of a testator to determine the distribution of his estate,
based on his own desires, rather than on a perceived societal ideal,
came to emerge as a right of the individual.
Many of the societal changes which took place in Louisiana were
also common to other western nations, including France, and were
reflected by changes in the laws of those nations. 14 Although the
Code Napoleon placed the surviving spouse at the end of the line for
inheritance in an intestate succession after all other relations capable
of inheriting,0 5 the status of the spouse has improved considerably in
France. Today, the surviving spouse inherits the entire intestate
succession if the decedent is not survived by any descendants, or by
his father or mother.106 When a decedent is survived by descendants
of the marriage with the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse has
an option to either take the usufruct of all the property or the
ownership of one quarter of the estate. Where the surviving
descendants are not issue of the marriage with the decedent, the
surviving spouse does not have that option, but inherits the one
quarter ownership of the decedent's property.10 7
103. Id. at 367.
104. See Glendon, supra note 4, at 32, in which she notes:
Marriage law in the countries considered here tracks this social
evolution precisely. It was moved from a situation once characterized by
family or parental selection of spouse, to the gradual introduction of a veto
by the child, then to choice of one's own spouse limited by the retention
of a parental veto, then to unfettered choice, and now finally to a situation
where people may and often do "correct" their original choices.
105. C. Nap.1804 art. 767 provided:
When the deceased leaves neither relations of a degree capable of
succeeding, nor natural children, the property of his succession belongs
to his conjunct not being divorced surviving him.
106. C. Civ. art. 757-2 provides:
In the absence of children or descendants of the deceased or of his father
and mother, the surviving spouse shall take the whole succession.
107. C. Civ. art. 757 provides:
Where a predeceased spouse leaves children or descendants, the
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In testate successions in France, there are limitations on the
amount that may be freely disposed of by the decedent. The
disposable portion is one-half if one child survives, one-third if two
children survive, and one-fourth if three or more children survive.'08
Another code article gives a testator who is survived by children,
whether they are issue of marriage with the surviving spouse or not,
the opportunity to choose from among three options to favor his
surviving spouse. He may leave the spouse the entire disposable
portion, he may leave the spouse one-quarter of his property in full
ownership and three-quarters in usufruct, or he may leave her all the
property in usufruct only." By legislative action in 2001, the
surviving spouse has been promoted to a forced heir as to one-quarter
of the decedent's estate, in the absence of descendants and
ascendants. "0
Perhaps as we in Louisiana make changes in our law, we should
carefully examine the amendments made by our precursor. This is
not to suggest that we blindly follow the path taken by France or any
other nation, but that, where the cultural changes promoting
legislative reaction are similar, we compare and, where appropriate,
adopt an approach resembling that of our civilian brothers and
sisters. As opinion surveys in France indicated a desire to improve
the status of the surviving spouse in inheritance, those surveys also
revealed a "continuing attachment to the traditional idea that property
surviving spouse shall take, at his or her option, either the usufruct of the
whole ofthe existing property or the ownership of the quarter where all the
children are born from both spouses and the ownership of the quarter in
the presence of one or several children who are not born from both
spouses.
108. C. Civ. art. 913 provides:
Gratuitous transfers, either by inter vivos acts or by wills, may not
exceed half of the property of a disposing person, where he leaves only
one child at his death; one-third, where he leaves two children; one-fourth,
where he leaves three or a greater number; without there being occasion
to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate children.
109. C. Civ. art. 1094-1 provides:
Where a spouse leaves children or descendants, either legitimate, born
or not of the marriage, or illegitimate, he or she may dispose in favour of
the other spouse, either of ownership of what he or she may dispose of in
favour of a stranger, or of one-fourth of his property in ownership and of
the other three-fourths in usufruct, or else of the totality of property in
usufruct only.
110. C. Civ. art. 914-1 provides:
Gratuitous transfers, either by inter vivos acts or by wills, may not
exceed three-fourths of the property where, failing descendants and
ascendants, a deceased leaves a surviving spouse, not divorced, against
whom does not exist an order ofjudicial separation which has become res
judicata and who is not a party to divorce or judicial separation
proceedings.
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should be preserved for children.""' Similar opinions were revealed
in the American surveys, with particular ambivalence as to treatment
of a second or subsequent spouse when the decedent died survived by
children of a former marriage." 2 Additionally, the American study
indicated a marked preference to treat all surviving children equally,
regardless of the marriage from which they were born.1
3
Yet, in the eagerness to provide a larger disposable portion and to
accommodate the surviving spouse in Louisiana, legislators lost sight
of the usual preference for equality among children. For example,
where children of a prior marriage exist as well as children of the
marriage of the decedent with the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse may hold a usufruct over the property of all the children, even
those who are stepchildren of the survivor. This is particularly
troublesome in a nation in which one-third of will contests relate to
issues of divorce and remarriage, and most of these are brought by
children and stepchildren." 4 For, it seems quite possible that children
may not be treated the same by a parent and a stepparent.
Additionally, by defining forced heirs in such a way that only those
under twenty-four are forced, inequality becomes even more of a
problem. Consider an estate where the decedent has made gifts
during life, which would be included in the mass estate for purposes
of calculating the forced portion.' ' If the decedent is survived by five
children, only one of whom is under the age of twenty-four, that child
must receive one-fifth of the mass estate. If that mass is much greater
than the net estate because of the gift giving, a parent cannot treat the
children equally, even if that is his desire.
Rather than succumb to the demands of free testation for each
individual, Louisiana may have been better served by improving the
status of the surviving spouse, while still balancing the interests of the
decedent's children. Perhaps if we had examined more closely the
path taken by the countries that had provided us our original model
for our Code, we may have also struck a balance that would have
better served our state.
111. Glendon, supra note 2, at 249 n. 156 (referencing Max Henry, "L'int~ret de
la fanille rduit a l'int&rt des 6poux," D. 1979, Chr. 179, 182).
112. See Fellows, supra note 99, at 364-68.
113. Id. at 368-73.
114. Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against
Disinheritance?, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 405, 411 (1997).
115. La. Civ. Code art. 1505.
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